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Adjusting communication to take into account information available to one’s audience is routine in humans but
is assumed absent in other animals, representing a recent development on the lineage leading to humans. This
assumption may be premature. Recent studies show changes in primate alarm signaling to threats according to
the receivers’ risk. However, a classic problem in these and other perspective-taking studies is discerning
whether signalers understand the receivers’ mental states or simply are responding to their behavior. We de-
signed experiments to exclude concurrent reading of the receivers’ behavior by simulating receivers using pre-
recorded calls of other group members. Specifically, we tested whether wild chimpanzees emitted differing
signals in response to a snake model when simulated receivers previously emitted either snake-related calls
(indicating knowledge) or acoustically similar non–snake-related calls (indicating ignorance). Signalers showed
more vocal and nonvocal signaling and receiver-directed monitoring when simulated receivers had emitted
non–snake-related calls. Results were not explained by signaler arousal nor by receiver identity. We conclude
that chimpanzees are aware enough of another’s perspective to target information toward ignorant group
members, suggesting that the integration of signaling and social cognition systems was already emerging in
early hominoid lineages before the advent of more language-specific features, such as syntax. from
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 INTRODUCTION
Amajor question in science is when in evolutionary history did animal
communication become influenced by another’s rather than one’s own
perspective or knowledge (1–6). Some primate alarm calling is influ-
enced by the receivers’ behavior, such that signalers appear to modify
their alarm calling according to the receivers’ level of risk in the face of a
threat. Haremmalemonkeys, for example, alarm call more when group
members are close to a threat [Cercopithecus mitis (7)] and stop calling
only after groupmembers have also alarm called [Presbytis thomasi (8)].
Chimpanzees aremore likely to call when groupmembers havenot seen
the threat (9, 10) or not heard threat-related calls (9) and aremore likely
to stop alarm calling after others have climbed to safety (10). Previous
studies suggest that signalers may take into account the perspective of
receiverswith respect to a current threat when signaling.We call this the
“receiver knowledge hypothesis.” However, previous studies (7–10) do
not rule out the possibility that signalers simply change their signaling
after reading the receivers’ behavior in threat contexts (approaching,
climbing, or behavior associated with alarm calling) rather than because
of what receivers could see or know. A classic problem in these and other
perspective-taking or mind-reading studies is finding an experimental
paradigm that convincingly excludes the possibility of concurrent behav-
ioral cueing, which could enable signalers to predict the receivers’ subse-
quent behavior through simpler mechanisms such as associative
learning rather than requiring mental state attribution (5, 6).
Some studies have examined the influence of perspective-taking on
vocal signaling in food rather than alarm contexts. In these studies,
chimpanzees changed their signaling depending on whether they could
be seen by a human experimenter with access to food (11, 12). Chim-panzees calledmore when the human experimenter had his or her back
turned or eyes closed rather than when facing chimpanzees with his or
her eyes open. In contrast, chimpanzees gestured more when the hu-
man experimenter faced them or had his or her eyes open. In addition,
they changed the vocalization emitted depending on whether a human
might facilitate food retrieval (13). When only food was present, chim-
panzees emitted food grunts. When a human stood next to the food,
chimpanzees emitted attention-getting vocalizations. Together, these
studies indicate that chimpanzees change their vocal production de-
pending on the attentional state of the human receiver with respect to
themselves, in contexts where they can gain a food reward. Motivation
to vocalize could either take into account another’s perspective or be
based on associative learning processes. Further research is required
to determine the extent to which social cognition might influence vocal
production.
Here, we examine whether chimpanzee vocal production is influ-
enced by another’s perspective in the context of threat. We present two
studies. Experiment 1 is a new analysis of nonvocal behavior, drawn from
a previous experiment that focused exclusively on vocalizations, to assess
what aspects of receiver behavior signalers attend to. Experiment 2
excludes the possibility of reading the receiver’s behavior besides the
vocalization presented, by using calls played back through a loud speaker
to simulate receiver presence. The experiment contrasts conditions in
which receivers are apparently aware or unaware of a threat, through
information expressed only in the playback vocalization. Some seconds
after hearing the playback, subjects then see a snake model, and without
presenting further receiver behavior, we examine any subsequent
changes in the subjects’ vocal output and speaker-directed attention.
The receiver knowledge hypothesis predicts that in the presence of
threats—here, snakes—chimpanzees motivated to inform ignorant
rather than knowledgeable others would invest more in signaling and
monitoring receivers when receivers had not seen the snake or emitted
snake-related calls. The hypothesis also predicts that the signaling effort
drops once the receivers express awareness of the snake, by either looking
at the snake in experiment 1 (Fig. 1) or by emitting snake-related alarm
calls in experiment 2 (Fig. 2). Thus, each experiment required subjects to1 of 12
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 monitor the receivers’ awareness of snakes in a different modality:
visually in experiment 1 and auditorily in experiment 2.
We tested the receiver knowledge hypothesis (H1) within the con-
text of three alternative, notmutually exclusive hypotheses. The signaler
habituation hypothesis (H2) predicts that, during each trial regardless of
nearby receivers, signalers with, rather than without, previous exposure
to the snake (seeing the snake or hearing snake-related calls) (14, 15)will
be less aroused upon seeing the stimulus and will have a shorter overall
reaction due to a simple habituation effect (14–19). The receiver identity
hypothesis (H3) predicts that alarm calling is influenced by the subjects’
relationship with the receiver, because previous studies (9, 10, 20) show
that signalers alarm call more when receivers are bond partners. The
receiver behavior hypothesis (H4) predicts that alarm call production
is driven by the signaler monitoring the risk behavior of receivers, such
as approaching the snake (10, 21), rather than monitoring the infor-
mation available to receivers. In this case, signalers should stop signal-
ing once the risk to receivers is reduced, such as when they leave the
snake rather than when they approach or sit in closest proximity to
the snake.
Most snakes are only dangerous to chimpanzees until detected (22),
after which they cease to be a threat. Hence, informing group members
of the presence of snakes could function to bring groupmembers into aCrockford, Wittig, Zuberbühler, Sci. Adv. 2017;3 : e1701742 15 November 2017position of safety. Chimpanzees produce both quiet (“alert hoos”) and
loud (“alarm barks”) alarm calls to snakes in ways that suggest an
underlying intention to change another’s behavior [sensu Dennett
(23)]. When they produce such calls, they typically look back and forth
between the snake and the receiver and persist in both of these behaviors
until the apparent goal has been achieved (10, 24, 25). Gaze alternation
and persistence in signaling until the goal has been met have long been
used as operational definitions of intentional communication in both
developmental psychology and ape research (25–27).
Alert hoos are produced in response to serious threats, like snakes
(9), and they direct the receivers’ attention to the general vicinity of the
snake (28). However, further cues are likely required to locate these
highly camouflaged snakes (see fig. S1 and video S1), such as following
the gaze of signalers (28), a widespread capacity among primates (29).
Chimpanzees can show sentinel-like behavior (9, 10, 28), sometimes
appearing to wait next to a snake as if to “mark” the position of the hid-
den threat for others (Fig. 1 and video S1). Marking, in addition to alert
hoos, potentially assists receivers in locating camouflaged snakes. To
test whether marking was influenced by receiver presence or behavior,
we determined whether the onset and cessation of marking behavior
were influenced by whether receivers could see the snake (H1, receiver
knowledge) or by the three alternative explanations (H2, signalerFig. 1. Experiment 1 setup and predictions: Chimpanzee behavior while seeing a snake model. We placed a partially hidden snake model (fig. S1) along the
anticipated travel path of a subject. We tested whether marking behavior took the visual perspective of receivers into account (whether the receiver could see a snake
model). Black chimpanzee, subject’s position and orientation with respect to the snake model and receivers; gray chimpanzee, the receiver’s position and orientation.
Behavior of the subjects upon seeing the snake when both arrive from the left side: (A) Subject’s attention is snake-focused. (B) Marking, strictly defined as repositioning
oneself to have direct visual access to both the snake and the receiver and to alternate gaze between the snake and the receiver. Gaze alternation was defined as head-turning
between the receiver and the snake without intervening looks in other directions. Receivers were defined as having seen the snake once they had an unobstructed view to the
model. (C) The subject leaves the snake. Predictions: H1 (receiver knowledge), the subjects engage in an initial phase of (A) but rapidly switch to (B). The subjects only switch
from (B) to (C) once the subjects have seen that the receivers see the snake. H2 (signaler habituation), the subjects engage in (A) and (C) only. H3 (receiver identity), the
subjects are more likely to engage in (B) if at least one receiver is a bond partner. H4 (receiver behavior), the subjects are more likely to stop engaging in (B) when the subjects
see that the receivers are no longer at risk, such as when leaving the snake. Green line, trail; log, hiding snake model; snake model, gaboon or rhinoceros viper.2 of 12
SC I ENCE ADVANCES | R E S EARCH ART I C L E
 o
n
 January 5, 2018
http://advances.sciencem
ag.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 habituation; H3, receiver identity; and H4, receiver behavior). We
defined the receiver’s first sight of the snake as occurring when receivers
had the first unobstructed view of the snake and simultaneously showed
an interruption of their current behavior, such as pausingwhilewalking.
We operationalized “marking” as repositioning oneself to have direct
visual access to both the snake and the receiver and as alternating gaze
between the snake and the receiver. Given the dense vegetation, we
deemed repositioning to be necessary for effective monitoring of re-
ceivers with respect to the snake: to enable visibility of both simulta-
neously (see Fig. 1). Marking onset was the first look toward receivers
after repositioning. Marking cessation was when the signaler either left
the snake model or engaged in no further gaze alternation. Gaze alter-
nation was defined as head-turning between the receiver and the snake
without intervening looks in other directions.RESULTS
Experiment 1: Snake model placement
Marking is influenced by receivers’ awareness of the snake
In experiment 1 (9), we placed a snake model (fig. S2) along the antici-
pated travel path of chimpanzees and videoed their behavior in prox-
imity to the snake model (Fig. 1) (9). Previously, we examined the
calling behavior of subjects from this data set (9), whereas we examined
here the nonvocal behavior using a series of generalized linear mixed
models (GLMMs) (see Materials and Methods). Marking occurred inCrockford, Wittig, Zuberbühler, Sci. Adv. 2017;3 : e1701742 15 November 201714 of 37 trials (n = 22 chimpanzees). In the first model, subjects were
more likely to engage inmarking (see Fig. 1) if receivers had not seen the
snake and if receivers were bond partners (Table 1A).Whether subjects
were the first to see the snake, or receivers were still approaching the
snake and hence were approaching danger, did not show significant dif-
ferences (Table 1, A and B).
It should be noted that, in all cases, whethermarking occurred, there
was an initial period of exclusively snake-focused attention, where
subjects did not look in other directions (table S1). In a second model,
examining the relative duration ofmarking, the subjectsmarked signif-
icantly longer before than after the receivers saw the snake (GLMM: b =
1.07, SE = 0.26, t = 4.15, P = 0.0003; Fig. 3A: mark duration before,
mean ± SD= 55 ± 42 s;mark duration after: 15 ± 6.3 s; video S2).When
examining cessation of marking, in all cases in which marking
occurred, the subjects stopped marking only after the receivers had
seen the snake (Fig. 3B). In contrast, cessation in marking did not co-
incide with the behavior of the receivers that reduced their risk, spe-
cifically as the receivers left the snake (only 2 of 14 cases) (Fig. 3B).
A small number of trials suggested that cessation of marking occurred
more rapidly when receivers also emitted an alert hoo upon seeing
the snake: Receivers emitted alert hoos in five trials in whichmarking
occurred. In four of these five cases, signalers stopped marking rap-
idly, within 5.4 ± 5.7 s (mean ± SD; range, 1 to 14 s; n = 4 subjects).
In sum, receivers seeing the snake influenced the occurrence or ces-
sation ofmarking, rather than the subjects’ own exposure to the snakeFig. 2. Experiment 2 setup and illustration of the results: A two-stimulus design where chimpanzees first hear a playback and then see a snake model. Arrow
thickness indicates chimpanzees’ level of attention. Speak bubbles represent number of calls and rate of calling. (A and B) Presentation of stimulus 1. (C and D) Presentation of
stimulus 2. The subject walks along a path and hears a playback of either a rest hoo (A) or an alert hoo (B), simulating a receiver. The subjects hearing a threat-related call (an
alert hoo) looked more to the speaker than after hearing a rest hoo, a call not associated with threats. After reacting to the speaker, the subjects then continued walking and
then saw a snake model hidden behind a log, some seconds after hearing the playback of a hoo. No further receiver behavior is presented. We asked: Does the subjects’
behavior change upon seeing the snake in a way that is consistent with them monitoring in the receivers’ perspective? (C) In the rest hoo condition (receiver-ignorant),
consistent with the subjects keeping track of the receivers’ perspective, the subjects persisted in monitoring the speaker and were highly likely to call and mark the
position of the snake. (D) In contrast, in the alert hoo condition (receiver-knowledgeable), the subjects dropped interest in monitoring the speaker, and called and
marked little. Slower calling rate in (C) compared to (D) is better explained by the receiver knowledge than the signaler habituation hypothesis. There was no change in
attention given to the snake across conditions. In the absence of visual cues, it appears that the subjects not only monitored the receivers’ awareness of a threat but
also changed their communication depending on the receivers’ awareness of the threat. Green line, trail; box, speaker hidden behind vegetation; snake model, gaboon
or rhinoceros viper hidden behind a small log. Relative distances at the time of playback were 5 to 10 m between the subject and the speaker, the subject and the
snake, and the speaker and the snake.3 of 12
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 (Table 1A) or other aspects of receiver behavior, such as whether
receivers were in the process of approaching the snake (Fig. 3B and
Table 1B).
Receivers use alarm calling and marking behavior
to locate snakes
In a third model, receiver behavior varied depending on the subjects’
signaling, with receivers being more likely to see the snake when both
signals (calling and marking) were given rather than just calling or no
signal (GLMM: c² = 6.41, df = 1, P = 0.011; Fig. 3C and Table 1C).
Specifically, receivers were more likely to cautiously approach rather
than avoid the snake in the 12 trials when marking by signalers co-
occurred with calling (cautious approach, 10 of 12 trials; table S1 and
video S2) compared to when calling occurred alone (cautious approach,
2 of 8 trials; video S3). Signaling ensured greater safety for receivers
in that when subjects signaled, whether calling or marking (22 trails),
receivers never passed within 1 m (biting distance) of the snake (Fig. 3C
and table S1). In contrast, in 40% (6 of 15) of trials, when subjects gave
no signal, receivers passed within biting distance (1 m) of the snake,
apparently unaware of the snake’s presence. Given that marking be-
havior showed signs of being highly receiver-sensitive, we included it
as a key variable in experiment 2.Crockford, Wittig, Zuberbühler, Sci. Adv. 2017;3 : e1701742 15 November 2017Experiment 2: Simulation of chimpanzee receiver
Signaling at snakes is influenced by a simulated receiver’s
previous vocalization
In a second experiment (Fig. 2), as chimpanzeeswalkeddown apath,we
played a call from a hidden speaker, simulating the presence of another
chimpanzee. After reacting to the playback, the subjects continued to
walk down the path for a further 5 to 10 m. The subjects then saw a
second stimulus, a previously placed snake model hidden behind a
log (fig. S1), some seconds after hearing the playback. We tested
whether the subjects’ reaction to the snake changed depending on the
call type they had heard some seconds earlier. No further cues repre-
senting the simulated chimpanzee (the receiver) were presented. Using
awithin-subjects design,we aimed to expose subjects to two trials counter-
balanced for call type so that subjects were played either a “rest” hoo or
one to three “alert” hoos. We tested the receiver knowledge (H1) and
signaler habituation (H2) hypotheses and controlled for receiver iden-
tity (H3) and receiver behavior (H4) in the experimental design. The
subjects’ vocal and nonvocal behaviors upon seeing the snake differed
depending on the call type they had heard some seconds earlier [per-
mutation test correcting formultiple testing (30): c² = 62.47,P= 0.004,
n = 10 subjects; Fig. 4 and Table 2]. The pattern of behaviors mainlyTable 1. Experiment 1: Chimpanzee marking behavior at snake models with respect to receivers. (A and B) The likelihood of subjects to initiate marking.
(C) The impact of signal type on receiver behavior. Binomial GLMMs: Marking, reposition oneself to see both the snake and the receiver and gaze alternate
between the snake and the receiver. H1, receiver has seen the snake before signaler calls or marks (yes/no); H2, subject is first to see the snake (yes/no); H3,
receivers include a bond partner (yes/no); H4, subjects could see or hear receivers approaching when first to see the snake. Random factors include subject
identity and event. Bold: P < 0.05. Model significance versus null model built of control predictors (for H2 to H4) and random effects: (A) c² = 9.91, df = 1, P =
0.002; (B) c² = 4.2, df = 1, P = 0.038. n = 37 cases, 22 subjects, and 12 snake placement events. We conducted two models instead of one due to model stability
issues with four predictor variables. After running model (A), we removed the nonsignificant variable, replaced it with the remaining predictor variable, and
reran the model [model (B)]. All significant variables remain significant with a Bonferroni correction [required across models (A) and (B)]. Model (C) included only
receivers who had not seen the snake. n = 27 cases, 17 subjects, and 12 events: c² = 6.41, df = 1, P = 0.011. See table S1 for the source data.Predictor variable b SE c² PA. Response variable: mark (yes)Intercept 11.60 9.80H1: Receiver knowledge: receiver has seen the snake (no) 21.34 10.4 9.91 0.002H2: Habituation: subject is first to see the snake (yes) −1.77 5.70 0.07 0.70H3: Receiver identity: bond partner present (yes) 19.98 8.13 11.60 0.001B. Response variable: mark (yes)Intercept 10.76 7.20H1: Receiver knowledge: receiver has seen the snake (no) 19.13 7.20 4.28 0.008H3: Receiver identity: bond partner present (yes) 20.48 8.98 13.45 0.022H4: Receiver behavior: receivers approaching (yes) 2.01 5.72 0.14 0.73C. Response variable: receiver behavior cautious approach (yes)Intercept 0.41 0.91Mark and call (yes) 2.60 1.13 6.44 0.011Call (yes) −0.69 1.22 0.32 0.574 of 12
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 supported H1 (receiver knowledge) but not H2 (signaler habituation).
Specifically, the subjects emitted more alert hoos after hearing a rest
hoo (not associatedwith snakes and thus indicating that the receiver is
not aware of the snake) rather than an alert hoo (associated with
snakes and thus indicating that the receiver is aware of the snake)
(Fig. 4A and Table 2). Note that, similar to the study by Crockford et al.
(9), the subjects never emitted alert hoos until they had seen the snake.
The subjects were also more likely to engage in speaker-directed mark-
ing and to combine marking and calling after hearing rest hoos rather
than alert hoos (Fig. 4D, Table 2, and videos S4 and S5). Speaker-
directed monitoring, after compared to before seeing the snake,
dropped in the alert hoo condition but persisted in the rest hoo condi-
tion (Fig. 4F and Table 2).
Against the signaler habituation (H2) hypothesis, the subjects’
rate of alert hoo production was slower, and the latency to the first
call tended to be slower in the rest hoo condition rather than in the
alert hoo condition (Fig. 4, B and C, and Table 2; see Materials and
Methods). There was also no significant effect on the number of alert
hoos played (whether one or three hoos) on the subjects’ own likelihoodCrockford, Wittig, Zuberbühler, Sci. Adv. 2017;3 : e1701742 15 November 2017of emitting an alert hoo, and therewas no effect across conditions on the
duration that subjects looked at the snake (Table 2).
Speaker-directed marking and calling were not significantly influ-
enced by possible confounding factors, the relative dominance rank
of subjects compared to simulated receivers, and the latency from
playback to seeing the snake (table S4), nor whether subjects were alone
or traveling with a maximum of two others when hearing the playback
(Table 2). The one exception was that the presence of other chimpan-
zees was associated with a tendency for slower rates of calling across
conditions.DISCUSSION
Two different experiments have revealed that chimpanzee vocal and
nonvocal responses at snakes are modified according to the receivers’
relation to a current threat. In experiment 1, in one-third of cases, usu-
ally when bond partners were present, the signalers marked the loca-
tion of the snake model, alternating gaze between the receivers and the
snake model (hereafter, snake). Signaling provided greater safety and0.2
0
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
Fig. 3. Experiment 1: Subjects’ marking at a snake model is influenced by the receivers’ perspective and influences receivers’ responses. (A) Relative duration
of the subjects’marking: before (mark 1) and after (mark 2) receivers have seen the snake. Dots joined by dashed lines, data per subject averaged across trials. Mark 1 + mark 2 =
total marking time. Inspect, duration over which the subjects’ attention remains snake-focused before engaging in marking (mean ± SD, 24 ± 13 s; range, 10 to 46 s; marking
defined in Fig. 1). Mark 1, duration from the beginning of marking until the receiver sees the snake (mean ± SD, 55 ± 42 s; range, 7 to 140 s). Mark 2, duration over which
marking continues after the receiver has seen the snake until the subject leaves snake or no longer looks to the snake (mean ± SD, 15 ± 6.3 s; range, 4 to 22 s). Darker dots, more
data points per value. *P < 0.05, ***P ≤ 0.001. Model significance versus the null model: c² = 12.99, df = 2, P = 0.002, n = 8 subjects, 10 cases, and 7 events. GLMM estimates:
inspect versus mark 1: b = 0.58, SE = 0.26, t = 2.25, P = 0.03; mark 2 versus mark 1: b = 1.07, SE = 0.26, t = 4.15, P = 0.0003; inspect versus mark 2: b = −0.49, SE = 0.26, t = −1.89,
P = 0.067. (B) Marking cessation with respect to receiver behavior (first bar) or when receiver sees the snake (second bar); y axis, proportion of cases. The bars show the subjects
that stopped marking after witnessing the following receiver behavior: left bar (risk-reducing behavior): white, leave the snake (not risk-reducing behavior); light gray, still
approaching the snake; dark gray, closest approach to the snake; black, no movement during marking; right bar: black, subjects stop marking after receiver sees the snake;
14 cases from n = 10 subjects (8 events). (C) The receivers’ behavior toward the snake depends on the subjects’ signaling. n = 37 cases, 22 subjects (12 events). Table 1C
shows the test result. Three bars show the differential signaling of subjects: no signal, call or mark (calling, n = 8; marking, n = 2), and call and mark. Blocks of color indicate
different receiver behaviors with respect to the snake model after the subjects’ signaling behavior. Approach, cautious approach to see a snake model; avoid, a detour of
>5 m around the snake; pass 1 m, pass within the biting range of snake model—apparently unaware of the snake; passed, receiver had either already passed the snake
or did not change position while the subject could see the snake model.5 of 12
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 more threat-related information for the receivers. When no signals
were given, the receivers passed within biting distance of the snake
in 40% of cases. When only alert hoos were given, the receivers avoided
the snake in 75% of cases. When marking also occurred, the receivers
were more likely to cautiously approach rather than avoid the snake. It
seems that although alert hoos advertise the general location of a hid-
den threat, marking points out the precise location, enabling others
within visibility of the signaler to gaze-follow and to safely detect the
hidden threat (for example, videos S1 and S2).
In experiment 2, after the subjects saw a snake model, they called
and marked more toward the speaker when a call not associated with
threats was played back some seconds earlier. Strikingly, the subjects
also showed a speaker-directed attentional shift from before to after
seeing the snake model, rapidly losing interest in the speaker direction
in the alert hoo condition but maintaining interest in the speaker di-
rection in the rest hoo condition, although no further receiver behavior
was presented. Rest hoos, which typically elicit least speaker-directed
attention compared to alert hoos (28), elicited greater persistence in
attention to the speaker after the subjects had seen the snake. The ob-
served changes in attention within and between conditions are hard to
explain in terms of the signalers’ arousal state or habituation to the
stimulus or in terms of the subjects merely expressing a simultaneous
interest in both the speaker and the snake (31). Experiment 1 findings
also suggest that the latter explanation is unlikely to be the case, because
the signalers only stopped marking after the receivers had seen the
snake. In addition, in three trials in experiment 1 where the receivers
were slow to see the snake, the signalers temporarily stopped attending
to the snake, although they remained within sight of the snake. In each
case, eventual interest or approach from the receiver toward the snakeCrockford, Wittig, Zuberbühler, Sci. Adv. 2017;3 : e1701742 15 November 2017precipitated the subjects’ re-engagement with the snake, until the
receiver saw the snake (see video S2 at 2 min 45 s).
In terms of calling behavior in experiment 2, against H2 (signaler
habituation), calling was not more rapid in the rest hoo condition com-
pared to the alert hoo condition. Rather, the opposite occurred—the
latency to the first hoo and the average latency between calls were
significantly longer in the rest hoo condition than in the alert hoo
condition (Fig. 4, B and C). Given that receivers were too far away
for the snake to represent an urgent threat, signalers may have invested
in monitoring receiver activity (H1, receiver knowledge) as much as in
calling. To effectively monitor themovements of out-of-sight chimpan-
zees, individuals need to remain silent and still to listen for audible cues
from the other (this is a frequent pattern seen in chimpanzees in their
low-visibility habitat, such as when engaged in long-distance contact
call exchanges: Individuals may stop traveling to call and then listen,
a pattern that may be repeated several times before continuing to travel,
personal observation). A simultaneous motivation to both inform and
monitor could result in the observed slower rate of calling after hearing
a rest hoo rather than an alert hoo.
It should be noted that althoughmore alert hoos were elicited in the
rest hoo conditions than in the alert hoo conditions, alert hoos were
nonetheless elicited in both conditions. Chimpanzees only extremely
rarely emit alarm calls when they cannot see a threat (9) and do not
alarmcallmerely in response to another’s alarmcall, in contrast to forest
monkeys (15). Thus, alert hoosmay be associated not only with a snake
but also with a signaler seeing a snake. Our results from experiment
1 suggest that alert hoos occasionally emitted by receivers may function
as “confirmation” of having seen the snake. This may have motivated
subjects (in the “role” of receivers) to emit an alert hoo upon seeing the0
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Fig. 4. Experiment 2: Subject’s signaling behavior toward the snake model differed depending on experimental conditions—the playback stimulus heard
previously. (A to D) Comparison of response to alert versus rest hoo stimulus. Dots joined by dashed lines, data per subject averaged across trials within conditions.
Larger dots, more data points per value. *P < 0.1, **P < 0.05, ***P < 0.01. Bar plot shows mean + SD with 95% confidence interval. GLMM results are shown in Table 2.
n = 10 subjects, 21 trials, and 12 dyads. Note that sample sizes and thus statistical power in (B) and (C) are particularly small, because only cases where calling
occurred could be included; x axis, experimental condition (playback stimulus played). (E) Speaker-directed scans after the playback before seeing the snake. (F) Post/prior
speaker-directed scans comparing subjects’ scans after seeing the snake with those before seeing the snake.6 of 12
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 snake after they heard a playback of an alert hoo, but this requires fur-
ther testing.
In sum, subjects engaged in greater signaling and monitoring
effort when simulated receivers had not emitted snake-related calls.Crockford, Wittig, Zuberbühler, Sci. Adv. 2017;3 : e1701742 15 November 2017This result could not have been due to signalers responding to con-
current behavior from receivers related to the playback call, given
that there was no additional behavior after the initial played back call.
Using a simulated receiver enabled us to keep receiver identity—andTable 2. Experiment 2: Subjects’ vocal, nonvocal, and monitoring behavior at snake models is best explained by the receiver knowledge, not signaler
habituation, hypothesis. Subjects’ overall responses across all tests differed significantly across conditions (permutation test correcting for multiple testing: c² =
62.47, P = 0.004). Parentheses denote the variable level that reflects the estimate when tested against the alternative level. GLMMs: H1 (receiver knowledge),
supported or tentatively supported by models (B) to (H); H2 (signaler habituation), not supported by models (B) to (H). n = 10 subjects, 21 trials, and 12 dyads.
Bold: P < 0.05; italic, P < 0.1. Test predictor for all models, experimental condition (rest hoo and alert hoo). Random factors for all models include subject identity,
dyad identity of subject, and call provider. Binomial, models (B), (E), and (F); Gaussian, models (A), (C), (D), and (G) to (I). Model significance versus null model,
effect size (marginal R2): (A) c² = 10.31, df = 1, P = 0.006; R2 = 0.16; (B) c² = 6.7, df = 1, P = 0.009; (C) c² = 3.12, df = 1, P = 0.077; R2 = 0.30; (D) c² = 3.96, df = 1, P =
0.046; R2 = 0.32; (E) variable “alone” excluded due to model stability: c² = 7.89, df = 1, P = 0.005; (F) c² = 9.9, df = 1, P = 0.002; (G) c² = 6.4, df = 1, P = 0.25; R2 =
0.26; (H) c² = 2.65, df = 1, P = 0.10; R2 = 0.17; (I) c² = 6.9, df = 1, P = 0.0085; R2 = 0.41. For models (C) and (D), cases containing zeros were excluded; thus, P values
are likely affected by low power (see Fig. 4, C and D, for paired data plots, table S2 for source data, and table S4 for additional analyses of control variables).Response variable Predictor variable b SE c² P H1 H2Calling and marking behaviorA. Number of calls emitted* Intercept 0.62 0.27Condition (rest hoo) 0.56 0.18 6.73 0.009 Yes† Yes†Alone (yes) 0.03 0.38 0.01 0.94B. Call or not Intercept 11.23 8.08Condition (rest hoo) 15.03 10.28 3.03 0.082 (Yes) NoNumber of alert hoos played −0.13 2.97 0.002 0.97 — NoC. Latency to first call* Intercept 1.66 0.41Condition (rest hoo) 0.85 0.46 3.12 0.077 (Yes) NoAlone (yes) −0.77 0.43 2.88 0.090D. Median inter-call interval* Intercept 8.65 5.96Condition (rest hoo) 12.66 6.65 3.96 0.046 Yes NoAlone (yes) −9.12 6.28 2.43 0.12E. Call and mark co-occurrence Intercept −10.83 6.02Condition (rest hoo) 20.28 8.33 7.89 0.005 Yes NoF. Mark or not Intercept −10.0 5.14Condition (rest hoo) 20.10 7.72 9.86 0.009 Yes NoAlone (yes) −0.26 4.90 0.003 0.96Attentional stateG. Scans to speaker/s: Post/prior seeing the snake Alone (yes) 0.50 0.20Condition (rest hoo) 0.46 0.16 6.42 0.011 Yes NoAlone (yes) −0.25 0.28 0.77 0.38H. Looking duration to the snake before first looking away Intercept 1.77 0.22Condition (rest hoo) 0.38 0.25 2.65 0.11 No NoAlone (yes) −0.24 0.25 1.10 0.30I. Scans to speaker/s after playback before the snake Intercept 0.53 0.08 6.91 0.009Condition (rest hoo) −0.26 0.08 — —Alone (yes) 0.17 0.09 2.60 0.107*Transformation, log + 1. †Confirms results of previous study but does not discriminate between hypotheses.7 of 12
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 hence the relationship between signaler and receiver—constant across
conditions. Although primate studies show that signaler habituation,
receiver identity, and receiver behavior do affect on the subjects’ re-
sponses to predators or threats (7–10, 32), experiment 2 showed that
chimpanzee signaling at snakes is also apparently driven by the subjects’
monitoring of the receivers’ current relation to a snake. This is a not
a spatially driven relation because receiver proximity to the snake was
held constant across conditions. The results mainly supported H1 (re-
ceiver knowledge) and not H2 (signaler habituation), suggesting that
signaler arousal and habituation to the snake stimulus had a weaker
influence on the subjects’ behavior than the information expressed by
the receivers about a threat or the receiver’s perspective with respect to
a threat.
We excluded some additional explanations. Given that alarm calls
can also function as a recruitment call for predator mobbing purposes
in some species, we excluded the influence of mobbing behavior in our
experimental design by selecting a stimulus that rarely elicits mobbing
—a nonpredatory snake (see the SupplementaryMaterials). In addition,
subgroup size (receivers within earshot) (21) cannot explain our results,
given that we kept subgroup sizes to a maximum of three individuals
including the subject and controlled for the influence of these individ-
uals on signaler response patterns in statistical models.
Bringing together the results from both experiments, the two
experiments elicited consistent signaling and receiver-directed behavior
from the subjects, specifically increased marking and calling at snakes
when the receivers expressed less information about the snake. This was
the case although the subjects had access to different receiver behaviors
in each experiment. In experiment 1, calling and marking were more
likely when the receivers had not seen the snake model. In experiment
2, calling and marking were more likely when the receivers had not
heard a snake-related call. The subjects’ behavior was generalized ir-
respective of the modality in which receiver ignorance was presented,
suggesting central cognitive processing (33) of the relationship between
the snake, the receivers, and the receivers’ status with respect to the
snake. In experiment 1, marking stopped soon after the receivers saw
the snake. Unlike in previous experiments where subjects try to attain a
personal gain, such as a food item (5, 34), the apparent goal of the
subjects was simply that the receivers see the snake, with no immediate
personal gain. A possible motivation for this was that once the receivers
had seen the snake, the snake ceased to be a threat to the receivers, given
the sedentary and likely nonpredatory nature of these snakes to chim-
panzees, bringing receivers into a position of safety (22).
We cannot completely rule out “killjoy” explanations (35), such as
that subjects could be behaving on the basis of learned associations
between the presence of a snake and the behavior of others, although
these experiments make this possibility less likely. For example, in ex-
periment 2, it could be that chimpanzees behave differently when they
are the first to see the snake [although here (Table 1A) and previously
(9), we find little support for this]. Previously, an analysis explicitly
only including subjects who were not the first to see the snake likewise
found that the subjects’ calling behavior varied depending on the infor-
mation available to receivers (9). In addition, previous studies (9, 10)
have shown that when new receivers arrive at the snake, subjects in-
crease their rate of calling.
Perhaps a more plausible alternative is that in the presence of a
snake, subjects perceive receivers who have neither seen the snake
nor emitted snake-related calls as being under threat. It may be this
perception, rather than perspective-taking processes, that precipitates
subjects’ informing and receiver-monitoring behavior. In this scenario,Crockford, Wittig, Zuberbühler, Sci. Adv. 2017;3 : e1701742 15 November 2017given that the threat faced by the receiver is not directly perceivable
(given that there is no receiver nor further presentation of receiver
behavior), we suggest that cognitive processing is still required to de-
termine that another individual faces a threat because they have not
visually or vocally “engaged” with a third entity, a snake. Here, in a
situation from which subjects do not receive any apparent immediate
gain (such as a food reward), they apparently invest in monitoring the
threat faced by another, even when the threat is spatially (5 to 7 m)
and temporarily (mean ± SD, 25.9 ± 21.1 s) separated from the simu-
lated receiver. Together, this indicates that social-cognitive processing
is influencing signaling behavior.
Overall, the results suggest that chimpanzee social cognition is not
only supported by concurrent behavior reading. Bugnyar et al. (34)
recently reached a similar conclusion for a playback experiment with
ravens (Corvus corax). They used a playback of sounds of ravenmove-
ment to indicate receiver presence in a competitive food-caching con-
text. The results indicated that ravens took into account visual access
of receivers, indicated by a peephole, even when no receivers could be
seen. Bugnyar et al. (34) concluded that “reduced” theories of mind,
such as a “minimal” theory of mind (36) or Whiten’s “intervening”
variable (37), provided closer explanations of the subjects’ observed
behavior than of concurrent behavior reading or of “full-blown” theory
of mind (5). A more recent study using an anticipatory looking para-
digm in chimpanzees indicates that they, like small children, use implicit
theory of mind to solve false belief tasks (38). In other perspective-
taking tasks, chimpanzees can infer the target of another’s attention,
behave strategically depending on what another can and cannot see
(39, 40), and show anticipation of another’s goal-directed action in
situations where there is no direct gain from doing so (38). However,
perspective-taking is a complex topic. Whether one individual under-
stands that another seeing an object—or giving a call highly associated
with an object—indicates another’s current knowledge and hence
demonstrates mental state attribution is much debated (5, 6) and will
not be resolved here.
Nonetheless, it seems relevant that we consider this body of work
when interpreting the results of this study. Here, chimpanzee subjects’
signaling and receiver-directed monitoring in both experiments are
consistent with the hypothesis that subjects were not only motivated
by their own perspective but also took the receivers’ perspective with
regard to the threat into account. When determining whether this con-
stitutes mental state attribution, minimal theory of mind (36), or, more
simply, an awareness of the receiver’s status with respect to the snake
and associated threat level, the cross-modal nature of the receiver be-
havior available to the subjects in this study will need to be taken into
account in further debates on this topic (6).
In addition to the social cognition involved in our two experi-
ments, we are also interested in the impact of social cognition on
signaling. Although perspective-taking has rarely been shown to influ-
ence vocal communication (3), apes are more likely to gesture when
they can be seen by the receiver (11, 13, 24) and to vocalize when
they cannot be seen by the receiver (11, 13). Here, subjects changed
their signaling and receiver-directed behavior depending on the re-
lationship between the snake, the receiver, and the receiver’s status
with respect to the snake, which was either explicitly visible (experi-
ment 1) or inferred from a vocalization that subjects heard before
they had seen the snake (experiment 2).
Thus, it seems highly likely that vocal production depends on
social-cognitive processes rather than being entirely emotionally driven
(6). In a recent review, Fischer and Price (31) suggest that primate vocal8 of 12
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 communication is goal-directed rather than limited to the expression
of emotional states, although it is not yet clear what social cognition
this would entail. Comparative studies are required to examine other
species’ signaling behavior using comparable experiments to deter-
mine the extent to which social cognition influences vocal produc-
tion. These experiments would be of particular interest in primate
species that have already indicated that alarm calling is influenced
by a complex relationship between the threat and the receivers, such
as has been shown in two primate species with a harem-male social
structure (7, 8).
Our results support those of previous studies (41, 42) with captive
chimpanzees, which demonstrated that chimpanzees use a gestural
point more to human caregivers who are unaware compared to those
who are aware of the location of an item (a tool or food) to request the
item, although this pointing gesture is not typically seen in the natural
gestural repertoire of this species. The pointing aided retrieval of food for
the ape subjects; however, Zimmermann et al. (41) questioned whether
the apes would have pointed in the absence of an immediate food
reward. In our study, informing ignorant others of a snake offered no
immediate benefit for signalers. Studies on language-trained apes have
shown informative pointing in the absence of immediate food rewards
(43). However, it has remained unclear whether these communica-
tive abilities are natural to chimpanzees or are limited to chimpanzees
trained by humans (3).
In a natural context, it seems that chimpanzees’ vocal, nonvocal,
and monitoring behaviors at snake models are influenced by social-
cognitive processes that are not limited to concurrent behavior reading
to an extent not yet demonstrated within the natural communication
of nonhuman animals. Here, we show a function of communication
in nonhuman animals, which seems to go beyond expressing own cur-
rent motivations, desires, or needs and suggests a motivation to inform
others who have not seen a threat or emitted threat calls. Although this
certainly falls short of humans’ avid capacity to share thoughts and
feelings, this shows initial awareness of what information might be
needed and relevant for another, relevance being a central feature of
human language usage (4, 44). We demonstrate that chimpanzees likely
have a key motivation for developing complex communication, previ-
ously thought to be absent in all natural nonhuman communication—
to fill another’s need for information. This is despite chimpanzees
apparently having a limited vocal repertoire and combinatorial ca-
pacity, which likely restricts message complexity (20, 28). For the
evolution of language, this study suggests that the required cogni-
tive capacities for honing informing in situations when others need
the information were to, some extent, in place in our last common
ancestor shared with chimpanzees, more than 8 million years ago
(45). This capacity to integrate communication and social cogni-
tion systems is a possible foundation of language evolution, arising
before the advent of more language-specific features, such as recur-
sive syntactic structure.MATERIALS AND METHODS
Animal ethics
Our study was approved by the St. Andrew’s Psychology Department
Ethics Board and complies with the ethics of both the Institutional
Animal Care and Use Committee and the Max Planck Society and
the ethics policy of the Department of Primatology, Max Planck Insti-
tute for Evolutionary Anthropology (www.eva.mpg.de/primat/ethical-
guidelines.html).Crockford, Wittig, Zuberbühler, Sci. Adv. 2017;3 : e1701742 15 November 2017Study site and subjects
Subjects were wild-living chimpanzees of the Sonso community in
Budongo Forest (Pan troglodytes schweinfurtii) (46), Uganda, habitu-
ated to human observers since 1995. Of a total of 77 chimpanzees, we
tested 22 subjects in experiment 1 with a snake model [8 adult males
(>15 years), 2 subadultmales (10 to 15 years), 7 adult females (>14 years),
and 5 subadult females (10 to 14 years)]. Chimpanzees were tested
opportunistically, depending on who arrived at the snake (table S1).
In experiment 2, we tested 10 subjects using a playback and the snake
model placement experiment (5 adult males, 2 subadult males, 2
adult females, and 1 subadult female). Using a within-subjects design,
we aimed to test each subject in each experimental condition (table S2).
We selected subjects based on their travel habits, choosing individuals
that most commonly traveled in central parts of the territory so that
multiple trials would be possible in the area where travel paths were
easiest to predict (fig. S1; see tables S1 and S2 for source data).
Experiment 1: Snake model placement
We analyzed data from a previously published experiment (9) where
chimpanzees saw a snake model placed on the anticipated travel trail.
Experiments were conducted from October 2008 to July 2010. Neces-
sary criteria for inclusion were that both the subject and the receivers
were either visible on video or continuously observed during the trial,
resulting in 37 cases of 22 chimpanzees from 12 separate snake place-
ment events (see the Supplementary Materials for variables measured).
Experimental setup. We placed a snake model along the anticipated
travel path of a subject (Fig. 1) (9). We used partially hidden placement
so that the snake would not be visible for more than a distance of 5 to
10 m (videos S2 and S3) but that at least one chimpanzee would be
likely to find the snake. We filmed chimpanzees as they approached
and saw the snake and continued filming until chimpanzees moved
out of sight of the snake or continued with other behavior, such as
feeding. Although we aimed to film all the chimpanzees in a given
subgroup, this was not always possible due to vegetation. In 4 of 14
marking cases, coding when receivers could see the snake was not
visible on video and hence was excluded from relevant analyses (Fig. 3,
A andB). Two to four humanobserverswere stationedwithin 50mof the
snake. They monitored chimpanzees within earshot (<50 m) and ob-
servedwhen receiverswere orwere not able to see the snake. Threemodel
snakesmadeof chickenwire andplaster of Pariswere used andpainted to
resemble either local rhinoceros (Bitis rhinoceros) or gaboon vipers (Bitis
gabonica; fig. S1).
Experiment 2: Simulation of chimpanzee receiver
We exposed the subjects to two sequential stimuli, mimicking scenarios
that occur naturally using a within-subjects design (Fig. 2). First, as
chimpanzeeswalkeddownapath,weplayed a call fromahidden speaker,
simulating the presence of another chimpanzee. After reacting to the
playback, the subjects continued to walk down the trial for a further 5
to 10 m. The subjects then saw the second stimulus, a previously placed
snakemodel hidden behind a log (fig. S1), some seconds after hearing the
playback (Fig. 2). Using a within-subjects design, we aimed to expose
subjects to two trials counterbalanced for call type so that the subjects
were played either a rest hoo or one to three alert hoos. Rest hoos are
commonly produced in close-range contact contexts not associated with
threats, potentially indicating that the simulated callerwas unaware of the
snake. Alert hoos are highly associated with the presence of hidden
threats, potentially indicating awareness of the snake. We kept the call
provider per subject constant across conditions to control for influences
related to receiver identity. We controlled for receiver behavior, the
playback being the only receiver behavior presented.We filmed the trials9 of 12
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 fromwhen subjects approached the speaker to after they either left or had
finished looking at the snake model. We conducted 21 trials on 10
subjects. Because we could not completely control which chimpanzee
was the first to see the snake, three individuals were exposed twice to
the same condition. Playbacks could be heard on the videos. We
entered the number of hoos played and whether subjects were alone
as control predictors in statistical models.
Playback experiments were conducted from April 2010 to
August 2010 and from June 2011 to July 2011, when subjects were
alone (n = 9 trials) or in small subgroups (maximum of two other
independent chimpanzees), as they walked past or rested within 5 to
10 m of a concealed speaker (Fig. 2). Considerable care was taken that
the animals whose call was being played, the “call provider,” would not
hear their own calls. To this end, one observer followed the call provider
and communicated via handheld radios when they were >200 m away
from the subject, well beyond the acoustic range of either call type
(<100 m).
Considerable care was also taken that the speaker was hidden in
dense vegetation 5 to 10 m away from the trail along which the subject
was expected to travel. The speaker was positioned at an angle of 60° to
90° from the subject’s expected head orientation when walking along
the trail. In all trials, the experimenter continuously filmed the subject
using a Panasonic NV-GS 330 DV camera with an MKE 400 external
Sennheisermicrophone for aminimumof 10 s before the playback until
at least 10 s after having seen the snake model. Eighteen different
stimuli from six call providers [one adult female and one subadult
female (individuals KW and RE), three adult males and one subadult
male (individuals NK, KT, SQ, and PS)] were used across the 10 sub-
jects. Experimentswere not conducted if the subjects traveledwithmore
than two independent other chimpanzees. The “subject”was defined
as the first to see the snake to control for habituation effects toward
the snake on calling behavior. The strength of social bonds was cal-
culated using the composite relationship index (47), and rank differences
used matrices based on standard chimpanzee criteria, submissive
pant grunt vocalizations [see the study byWittig et al. (48) and the Sup-
plementary Materials in that article for analyses]. To avoid habituation
to any of the playback stimuli, we conducted experiments below the fre-
quency of naturally occurring hoos, and subjects rarely, if ever, heard
playback stimuli on consecutive days (see the Supplementary Materials
for further details including variablemeasured and selection of playback
stimuli).
Predictions specific to experiment 2
The sedentary nature of gaboon and rhinoceros vipers (22) means that
snake models only represent an urgent threat to chimpanzees when in
close proximity (<2 m)—the case for all subjects in this experiment but
for none of the simulated receivers. A previous primate alarm call
playback experiment (15) showed that Diana monkeys (Cercopithecus
diana) who had not previously heard stimuli associated to a specific
predator, either an eagle or leopard, called more rapidly upon first pre-
sentation of the eagle or leopard call compared to Diana monkeys who
had already heard the specific predator-associated vocalization, whether
this was a conspecific alarm call or from the predator itself. Taking this
into account, if signaling is principally arousal-driven, relating to the
signalers’ own perspective (H2, signaler habituation hypothesis), then
signalers without previous exposure to snake-related stimuli should
be more aroused upon finding the snake, and hence, signalers should
callmore rapidlywhen naïve to the snake’s presence (after hearing a rest
hoo rather than an alert hoo).Crockford, Wittig, Zuberbühler, Sci. Adv. 2017;3 : e1701742 15 November 2017Crucially, however, if subjects take the receivers’ perspective or
knowledge into account, then seeing the snake should change the
subjects’ behavior toward the receivers. The subjects saw the snake
model some seconds after hearing the playback of a hoo, but no fur-
ther receiver behavior was presented. The question is whether the sub-
jects’ track the associated shift in the putative receivers’ perspective
that is provided by the presence of the snake. If the subjects take
the receiver’s perspective into account, we expected the subjects’ atten-
tion to the speaker and calling behavior to change after seeing the
snake, depending on the call type heard some seconds earlier. A pre-
vious study (28) showed that a playback of an alert hoo elicited more
attention (scans) to the speaker than a rest hoo, where scans are the
number of moves of a chimpanzee’s head position while looking at the
speaker (see the Supplementary Materials). Here, we expected a simi-
lar result until the subjects see the snake model. However, after seeing
the snake, we expected a shift in speaker-directed attention. For H1
(receiver knowledge), we expected a decline in speaker-directed atten-
tion in the alert hoo condition (if the signaler understands the receiver
is aware of the snake) but an increase in the rest hoo condition (if the
signaler understands that the receiver is not aware of the snake). For
H2 (signaler habituation), no such snake-dependent or condition-
dependent shift in speaker-directed attention was expected. Instead,
the duration in attention given to the snake should be longer in the
rest hoo condition (the signaler has no previous information about the
snake) than in the alert hoo condition (the signaler has already been
primed to the snake’s presence).
Thus, H1 and H2 have opposite or different predictions in the
following three behavioral variables: calling, marking, and attention
given to the snake and the speaker (table S3). Using a playback to
simulate a receiver enabled us to keep receiver identity (H3) constant
across conditions and to exclude all concurrent behavior reading by
receivers, beyond the playback stimulus (H4). We also expected that
the subjects’ marking and calling might be motivated by present,
rather than playback, individuals, in trials where subjects were not
alone. To account for this, we coded marking only when marking in-
cluded gaze alternation between the speaker and the snake. Gaze alter-
nation between other chimpanzees and the snake was not coded as
marking. All alert hoos were counted as speaker-directed, because
vocalizations are nondiscriminatory for audiences within earshot.
Statistical analysis for experiments 1 and 2
We conducted a series of linear and GLMMs (49) using R version 3.0.2
(R Core Team, 2013) and the function lmer for Gaussian, and glmer for
binomial and Poisson, models from the package lme4 (50). We com-
pared the fit of both full models with that of a respective null model
lacking only the test predictors but otherwise being the same as respec-
tive full model in all other terms, using a likelihood ratio test. For exper-
iment 1, to test the duration of marking relative to when receivers saw
the snake, we ran the GLMM Gaussian model (Fig. 3A). The response
variable duration was transformed to log + 1 to comply with model as-
sumptions. Random factors were subject identity, snake placement
event, and subject trial per event. Random factors were subject identity
and snake placement event (see the SupplementaryMaterials for further
details). No test was conducted for Fig. 3B because the result provided
no variation for the test predictor (receiver sees the snake), and the small
sample was small.
In experiment 2, to test the impact of the experimental conditions on
the subjects’ signaling and monitoring behavior, we ran a number of
GLMMs to determine the impact of test and control predictors on
different signaling behaviors of subjects. In these models, we did not10 of 12
SC I ENCE ADVANCES | R E S EARCH ART I C L Einclude control variables of social bond and dominance rank, because
we controlled for social bond by using call providers with a neutral re-
lationship to subjects and because rank did not show significant effects
on signaling behavior in experiment 1 (see the Supplementary
Materials) (9). To correct for multiple testing across GLMMs, we used
the permutation-basedmodification of Fisher’s omnibus test to account
for nonindependent data (30). Gaussian models used maximum likeli-
hood estimates. Binomial models used a logit link function. For all
models, we compared the fit of the full model with that of the respective
null model lacking only the test predictors but otherwise have the same
terms as the respective full model (51), using a likelihood ratio test.
“Blind”-coded interrater reliability tests on key variables showed good
overall interrater reliability: Cohen’s k = 0.74, z = 3.7, P = 0.002 (see
the Supplementary Materials). o
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 SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIALS
Supplementary material for this article is available at http://advances.sciencemag.org/cgi/
content/full/3/11/e1701742/DC1
video S1. Western chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes verus) in the Tai National Park, Ivory Coast,
see real, highly camouflaged rhinoceros viper (www.youtube.com/watch?v=AVXU9C-Oq2k;
see fig. S3 for stills).
video S2. Experiment 1 with marking: Kato alert hoos and marks a gaboon viper model for an
ignorant receiver with whom he shares a bond (Pan troglodytes schweinfurthii, Budongo
Forest, Uganda).
video S3. Experiment 1 without marking: Squibbs alert hoos but does not mark a gaboon viper
model for ignorant receivers with whom he does not share a bond (P. troglodytes
schweinfurthii, Budongo Forest, Uganda).
video S4. Experiment 2: Rest hoo condition (P. troglodytes schweinfurthii, Budongo Forest,
Uganda).
video S5. Experiment 2: Alert hoo condition (P. troglodytes schweinfurthii, Budongo Forest,
Uganda).
Supplementary Methods
table S1. Source data for experiment 1: Marking behavior in relation to test and control
variables.
table S2. Source data for experiment 2: Vocal and nonvocal behaviors of subjects per trial after
seeing a snake model.
table S3. Experiment 2: Predictions for receiver knowledge (H1) and signaler habituation (H2)
hypotheses.
table S4. Experiment 2: Control predictors have little influence on chimpanzee calling and
marking behavior.
fig. S1. Typical scenario upon viper (B. rhinoceros) detection by chimpanzees.
fig. S2. Vipers photographed in the Budongo Forest and replica snake models used in the
experiments.
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